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David Drew
Results: 124

#	Item
81	MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:22:50 Nash equilibrium Extensive-form game Centipede game Solution concept Outcome Strategy Determinacy Normal-form game Best response Game theory Problem solving Self-confirming equilibrium
82	A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First Version: August 5, 2004 This Version: September 14, 2005 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2005-09-14 23:03:24 Behavior Ethology Dynamic inconsistency Hyperbolic discounting Wolfgang Pesendorfer David Laibson Economic model Nash equilibrium Decision making Game theory Decision theory Mind
83	Timing and Self-Control Drew Fudenberg* and David K. Levine First Version: August 5, 2009 This Version: September 6, 2010 Abstract: The dual self-model of self-control with one-period lived short-run selves is excessiv Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2010-09-06 20:12:57** Marginal concepts Costs Science Social psychology Marginal utility Marginal cost Intertemporal choice Long run and short run Self control Decision theory Economics Microeconomics
84	When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27 Nash equilibrium Outcome Best response Normal-form game Repeated game Strategy Bayesian game Risk dominance Game theory Problem solving Extensive-form game
85	The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2004-06-17 14:23:12 Outcome Quadrature amplitude modulation Strategy Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Normal-form game Repeated game Risk dominance Epsilon-equilibrium Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium
86	PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT DREW FUDENBERG, DAVID K. LEVINE AND SATORU TAKAHASHI A BSTRACT. The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to on Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2005-09-12 23:46:36 Group theory Vector space Vectors Constructible universe Nash equilibrium Ordinal number Spectral theory of ordinary differential equations Symbol Algebra Mathematics Linear algebra
87	Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction * Running Title: Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2001-06-16 12:14:50 Sequential equilibrium Bayesian game Extensive-form game Nash equilibrium Rationalizability Self-confirming equilibrium Solution concept Normal-form game Strategy Game theory Problem solving Economics
88	Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox Drew Fudenberg* and David K. Levine First Version: May 12, 2006 This Version: February 5, 2010 This paper develops a dual-self model that is compatible with modern dy Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2010-02-05 05:29:47** Ethics Behavior Decision theory Social psychology Actuarial science Behavioral economics Expected utility hypothesis Allais paradox Self control Utility Economics Behavioral finance
89	A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: November 1, 2007 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2007-12-13 13:39:35 Generating functions Normal distribution Berry–Esseen theorem Integration by substitution Central limit theorem Moment-generating function Probability theory Mathematical analysis Statistics
90	Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed] Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41 Outcome Strategy Normal-form game Repeated game Risk dominance Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium

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